Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 58
Issue 3 Issue 3 - April 2005

Article 3

4-2005

Taking Miranda's Pulse
William T. Pizzi
Morris B. Hoffman

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
William T. Pizzi and Morris B. Hoffman, Taking Miranda's Pulse, 58 Vanderbilt Law Review 813 (2005)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol58/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information,
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

TAKING MIRANDA'S PULSE
William T. Pizzi*and Morris B. Hoffman**
I.
II.
III.

IV.

IN TRODU CTION ....................................................................
813
BIRTH AND EARLY CHILDHOOD ........................................... 814
PUBERTY AND THE PAINFUL QUESTION OF
P RO PHYLAXES ...................................................................... 819
THE MID-LIFE CRISIS: DICKERSONAND CHAVEZ ................ 823

A.
B.
V.

V I.

Dickerson v. United States ......................................
Chavez v. M artinez ..................................................

823
827

SETTLING INTO A POST-CRISIS MATURITY:
SEIBERT AND PATANE ..........................................................

830

A.
B.

831
836

Elstad R evisited .......................................................
Tangible Fruits........................................................

D IA GN O SIS ...........................................................................

840

A.

V II.

Confounding Self-Incrimination
W ith Due Process.....................................................
B.
DisentanglingSelf-Incrimination
from D ue Process .....................................................
P RO GN OSIS ..........................................................................
I.

840
845
847

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court decided five Miranda1 cases in 2003-2004,
making this one of the most active fifteen-month periods for the law of
self-incrimination since the controversial case was decided in 1966.2
In this Article, we consider three of those five cases-Chavez v.

Professor of Law and Byron White Center Fellow, University of Colorado School of Law.
I would like to thank two students, Daniel Rosenberg and William Stenzel, for their research
help.
District Judge, State of Colorado, Second Judicial District (Denver). I would like to
thank one of my interns, Daniel D'Angelo, for his research help. The views expressed here do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Second Judicial District or any of my colleagues on that
Court.
1.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2.
It also decided what most commentators expected would be a sixth Miranda case, Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519 (2004), but it did not reach the Miranda issue in that case.
See infra note 34.

813

814

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:3:813

Martinez,3 Missouri v. Seibert4 and United States v. Patane5-along
with the blockbuster decision four years ago in Dickerson v. United
States.6 in an attempt to decipher what, if anything, this remarkable
level of activity teaches us about the direction of the Court's
self-incrimination jurisprudence. In the end, while these cases, like
those before them, may not entirely clarify where the Court is going,
they do make it plainly clear where the Court is not yet willing to go.
As unsatisfactory as this may be to the purists on both sides of the
Miranda controversy, this most recent set of self-incrimination cases
demonstrates that a solid majority of the Court, anchored by Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy, is willing to keep the Miranda rule pretty
much where it has been mired for almost forty years: with its head in
a constitutional never-never land but its feet firmly planted in a
majority of the Court's apparently unshakable view of the realities of
police interrogation.
By continuing to treat Miranda's core as a decision under the
Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, but analyzing its
extensions and limitations using the tools of due process, these new
cases also confirm that the Court intends to continue to confound
these two very different constitutional principles. Ironically, that
continued confounding will insure Miranda's continued survival,
because, as these new cases illustrate, due process principles keep
Mirandacontained but they also keep it alive.

II. BIRTH AND EARLY CHILDHOOD
For 175 years, the Supreme Court interpreted the Fifth
Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause to mean nothing more than
what it says: namely, that criminal defendants cannot be compelled to
testify in their own criminal proceedings. 7 "Proceeding" meant the
criminal trial in question.8 "Compelled," in the context of testimony, 9
3.
4.

538 U.S. 760 (2003).
124 S.Ct. 2601 (2004).

5.
124 S.Ct 2620 (2004). The other two cases, though touching on self-incrimination, were
much less significant, and will not be discussed in this Article. See Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. of
Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004) (Nevada statute criminalizing properly stopped citizen's refusal to
give police name and address does not violate Fifth Amendment) and Yarborough v. Alvarado,
541 U.S. 652, 666, 667 (2004) (state court's failure to consider suspect's young age in making its
determination of whether suspect was in custody for Miranda purposes was not a violation of
clearly established law for habeas corpus purposes).
6.
530 U.S. 428 (2000).
7.
The Self-Incrimination Clause provides that "[n]o person... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8.
See, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination
Clause, 29 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1930) (arguing that the Self-Incrimination Clause should be
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meant that a defendant could not be held in contempt for refusing to
testify; there was no "right to remain silent," only the right not to be
held in contempt if one chose to remain silent.10
Both of these pillars of limitation came crashing down in 1966
with the Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona." In a 5-4 decision,
the Court held for the first time that the Self-Incrimination Clause
operated in the stationhouse and not just in the courthouse. 12 The
Court also held for the first time that confessions would be deemed
"compelled"
for
self-incrimination
purposes,
and
therefore
inadmissible, if they were obtained without first advising the suspects
of their "right to remain silent," of a new Fifth Amendment right to

interpreted to mean that no one shall be compelled to give oral testimony against him- or herself
as a defendant in a criminal proceding). As recently as 2000, the Court described the protections
of the Self-Incrimination Clause as being limited to "compelled testimony that is used against
the defendant in the trial itself," United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 37 (2000), although there
is a long line of cases extending the protections to pre-criminal proceedings such as grand juries
or civil cases where the questioning could incriminate the witness in any future criminal
proceedings. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973); Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972). This extension of the words "in any criminal case" to pre-criminal case
testimony was the first of what the Court would later call "prophylactic" extensions of the text of
the Self-Incrimination Clause. See infra text accompanying notes 28-38. But see Thomas Y.
Davies, Fartherand Fartherfrom the OriginalFifth Amendment: The Recharacterizationof the
Right Against Self-Incrimination as a "TrialRight" in Chavez v. Martinez, 70 TENN. L. REV. 987,
1026-30 (2003) (arguing that the Framers actually intended the Self-Incrimination clause to
prohibit coerced confessions quite apart from their admission at any trial).
9.
One very interesting question, which the Court has never expressly addressed, is
whether the word "witness" in the self-incrimination clause means one who gives testimony, or
whether the Founders intended the word to mean one who provides any evidence at all, whether
testimonial or non-testimonial. The cases have presumed, without any particular historical
inquiry, that "witness" is limited to its testimonial context, though Justices Scalia and Thomas,
of all people, have suggested otherwise. See infra note 111.
10. See, e.g., 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2266, at 400
(John T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961) (noting that courts tend to confound the rule excluding
confessions and the rule creating a privilege against coerced testimony). Professor Alschuler
makes a powerful case that the restrictive language of the Self-Incrimination Clause did not fully
reflect pre-constitutional English and colonial common law, which really did recognize a "right to
remain silent" bound up with deeply held views about the theological nature of the oath. Albert
W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94
MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2631-32 (1996). That observation, however, does not really advance the
constitutional inquiry, since the Founders, whether mistaken or not, chose language in the Fifth
Amendment that did not create a "right to remain silent" in this broad sense.
11. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
12. In dicta in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964) (quoting Bram v. United States, 168
U.S. 532, 542 (1897)), the Court had hinted that it might be moving in this direction when it
announced that the voluntariness of a confession was controlled by the privilege against s
elf-incrimination. This dicta was criticized at the time as a "shotgun wedding of the privilege to
the confessions rule." Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police
Interrogation,25 OHIO ST. L.J. 449, 465 (1965).
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counsel, 13 and of the rest of the now famous litany of mandatory
advisements.14
The Court's interpretation was not only an unprecedented
stretch of the language of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 15 it was also
done in the face of a long history of judicial supervision of the problem
of coerced confessions, first under the common law and then under the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
Court has always expressed disapproval of coerced confessions, a
disapproval whose roots can be traced to the Star Chamber, as Chief
Justice Warren pointed out in his majority opinion in Miranda.16 That
disapproval had always been grounded in the confluence of twin evils:
coerced confessions can be less trustworthy than voluntary
confessions; and, distinct from trustworthiness, the dignity of the
individual is offended when the state tortures or otherwise unduly
17
coerces citizens to confess.
These principles undergirded a rich pre-Miranda case law
dealing with the problem of involuntary confessions, and included an
evolving notion of "coercion"-facilitated by evolving notions of due
process-extending beyond physical torture to include psychological

13. Miranda introduced an implied Fifth Amendment right to counsel that attaches upon
custodial interrogation, separate from the explicit right to counsel contained in the Sixth
Amendment, which generally does not attach until charges are filed. United States v. Gouveia,
467 U.S. 180, 180-81 (1984). This has caused some confusion over whether the standards for
waiving these two rights to counsel should be the same. See, e.g., Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S.
285, 286 (1988) (holding that the Miranda warnings are sufficient to show a knowing and
intelligent waiver prior to questioning of a suspect whose Sixth Amendment right to counsel had
attached).
14. The complete litany, as crafted by Chief Justice Warren's own words, is:
[The suspect] must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the
right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will
be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
15. In dissent, Justice Harlan labeled the majority's reasoning a "trompe lbeil," a French
phrase describing a kind of illusory painting. Id. at 510-11 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Joining
Justice Harlan's dissent were Justices Stewart and White, with Justice Clark separately
dissenting.
16. Id. at 459 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
17. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), is one of the most interesting due process
cases because these twin objectives of due process-the reliability of the truth-finding process
and the dignity of the individual-pulled in opposite directions. Mr. Faretta wanted to represent
himself at trial, but the state trial judge ruled he must be represented by counsel in order to
assure him a fair trial. The Supreme Court sided with Faretta, despite its acknowledgment that
defendants who choose to represent themselves will usually be acting to their detriment. The
Court held that a defendant's choice in this matter must control, out of "that respect for the
individual which is the lifeblood of the law." Id. at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337,
350-51 (1970)).
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torture and even, in some circumstances, simple police deceit.18 This
voluntariness inquiry was plenary-courts were directed to look at the
totality of circumstances in a given case to determine whether, under
the Due Process Clause, a particular confession was voluntary.19
The Miranda majority rejected this level of protection as
ineffective in a modern world where, it claimed, the very nature of
police/citizen interaction was coercive, and traditional judicial
attempts to ferret-out police coercion were ineffective. The majority
therefore imposed a positive obligation on police to advise suspects of a
given litany of rights before any custodial interrogation could begin.
The price of failing to do so was that any unadvised statements would
be deemed "coerced," and would not be admitted at trial.
Criticisms of the decision, including those of the four
dissenters, have coalesced around the opinion's three most
controversial aspects: (1) Is the majority's view of the "inherently
20
coercive" nature of the police/citizen relationship an accurate one?

18. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 505 (1963) (confession involuntary where
suspect held incommunicado for sixteen hours and told he would be not be allowed to call wife or
lawyer until he confessed); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 531 (1963) (confession involuntary
where suspect's apartment surrounded by police and suspect told that financial aid to her
children would be cut off and her children taken from her unless she cooperated); Leyra v.
Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558-61 (1954) (confession involuntary where suspect questioned on
different days for eight hours, twenty-three hours and two hours, and during last session police
psychiatrist, posing as medical doctor called to treat suspect's sinus condition, attempted to
hypnotize suspect); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936) (confession involuntary
where defendant beaten and tortured over several days).
19. See, e.g., Haynes, 373 U.S. at 513 (holding that a court must consider "all of the
attendant circumstances" when determining whether a confession was coerced); see also Payne
v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 562 (1958) (noting that coercion can only be found "by reviewing the
circumstances under which the confession was made"); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 228
(1940) (requiring a "review of the facts upon which that issue [coercion] necessarily turns").
20. Most of the early critics on this point argued that the Court had an unduly cynical view
of police interrogation, that what it characterized as an "inherently coercive" atmosphere was
merely a conclusory description, that the Court made factual assumptions about the coercive
nature of police interrogation for which there was no support in the record, and that Miranda
might spell the end of effective police interrogation. For example, Justice Clark argued in his
dissent that the majority had misrepresented what actually happens during interrogation.
Miranda,384 U.S. at 499-500 (Clark, J., dissenting). He pointed out that the "police manuals"
described at length in the majority opinion, far from having been shown to have been widely
adopted in police departments, had not been shown to be the official police manual for even a
single police department. Id. He worried that the Court's broad opinion would undermine all
interrogation efforts, not just those that put coercive pressure on suspects. See id. at 500 ("Such
a strict constitutional specific inserted at the nerve center of crime detection may well kill the
patient."). Until there was better empirical support for the majority's concerns, Justice Clark
would have preferred that the Court continue to control abuses through the Due Process Clause.
Id. at 501. Versions of Justice Clark's empirical criticisms were echoed by many commentators.
See infra note 21.
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(2) Even if it were, does Miranda cure the disease? 21 (3) Finally, does
the majority's view of the problem justify, as a constitutional matter,
the Court's unprecedented extension of the Self-Incrimination
22
Clause?
Despite an unbroken cavalcade of criticisms-including
Congress's 1968 legislation purporting to overrule the decision in
federal cases 2 3 -Miranda's early years were relatively uneventful.
Between 1966 and 1971, the Court decided only a handful of
self-incrimination cases, and none of those was terribly controversial.
The most important were Johnson v. New Jersey24 and Jenkins v.
Delaware,25 two cases that established that Miranda was not retroac26
tive.
21. Justice Harlan, in a dissent joined by Justices Stewart and White, worried that the
majority opinion's system of warnings might have the perverse effect of stopping permissible
police questioning of suspects, but not stopping unduly coercive questioning. He argued that
police officers who would engage in impermissible forms of coercion to extract a confession were
likely to be quite capable of lying about the pressures they had employed to extract a Miranda
waiver. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 504-05 (Harlan, J., dissenting). More recent critics have taken up
this argument that Miranda'sformalism has left police in a position to do more mischief rather
than less. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Miranda's Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 988 (2001)
(reviewing data that suggest that few suspects exercise their Mirandarights during questioning
and that coercive questioning is pervasive); George C. Thomas III, Miranda's Illusion: Telling
Stories in the Police Interrogation Room, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1091, 1092 (2003) (noting that if
Miranda rights are waived, courts rarely question whether coercive measures were used). These
criticisms have been bolstered by studies showing that giving or not giving the Miranda
warnings has very little impact on a suspect's willingness to talk, See Paul G. Cassell, All
Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda's Defenders, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1084, 1087
(1996) (arguing that the benefits of Miranda are far outweighed by its costs). But see Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Miranda's PracticalEffect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs,
90 Nw. U. L. REV. 500, 563 (1996) (arguing that Mirandais the best method of dealing with high
crime rates). One of best presentations about Miranda's empirical failures is WELSH S. WHITE,
MIRANDA'S WANING PROTECTIONS (2001).

22. The constitutional criticisms of Miranda have included not only the textual critiques
outlined in this Article, but also deeper, federalism-based criticisms about the Court's Article III
power to regulate the manner in which state police officers conduct their interrogations. See, e.g.,
Joseph D. Grano, ProphylacticRules in CriminalProcedure:A Question of Article III Legitimacy,
80 Nw. U. L. REV. 100, 147-56 (1985). As discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 46-48,
the Court has managed to turn this potential constitutional infirmity into a constitutional
strength, by concluding that Miranda must have been a rule of constitutional import precisely
because the Court could not have otherwise constitutionally exercised supervisory authority over
state courts.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968). This provision was held unconstitutional in Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 431-32 (2000), which is discussed in Part IV.A below.
24. 384 U.S. 719, 721 (1966) (holding that Miranda only applied to trials begun after the
decision).
25. 395 U.S. 213, 213-14 (1969) (holding that Mirahda did not apply retroactively to
post-Mirandaretrials).
26. There were only two other substantive Miranda cases decided by the Court in those
first five years: Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) (dealing with the problem of a suspect's
ambiguous invocation of the right to counsel) and Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) (dealing
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The first significant limitation on the case came in 1971, when
the Court held in Harris v. New York 27 that Miranda's exclusionary
rule is limited to use of the un-Mirandized statement by the
prosecution in its case in chief, and that prosecutors are not prohibited
from using otherwise voluntary but un-Mirandized statements to
impeach defendants who choose to testify. Harris was a startlingly
short opinion-it consumed a mere four pages in the U.S. reportsand the 5-4 majority's reasoning, written by the then new Chief Justice Burger, was terse: defendants have the right not to testify, but if
they elect to testify they have no right to perjure themselves. Their
voluntary, albeit un-Mirandized prior statements can be used to
impeach them just like any traditionally voluntary prior statement
can be used to impeach any witness on cross-examination.
Harriswas the first ripple in what would become, over the next
fifteen years, a tidal wave of controversy over Miranda's implications,
a controversy driven by the decision's fundamental paradox of treating
perfectly voluntary and reliable confessions as if they were "coerced"
in a very new and untested sense.

III. PUBERTY AND THE PAINFUL QUESTION OF PROPHYLAXES
The Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause contains its
own exclusionary rule; indeed, the clause itself is a kind of preemptive
exclusionary rule. 28 A defendant simply cannot be compelled to testify
by threat of contempt. The jury therefore never hears such compelled
testimony. The rule in Miranda, by contrast, is a steroidal extension
of that internal constitutional exclusionary rule, and was designed as
a prophylaxis to discourage what the majority believed were
widespread, fundamentally unfair, and often undetectable police
practices in the interrogation room.
The Miranda majority was convinced that police, restrained
only by the prospects of a difficult case-by-case voluntariness inquiry,
were regularly overpowering suspects' volition, both by the "inherently
with the question of when a suspect is in "custody" for purposes of Miranda). These are difficult
problems in the every day world of police interrogation and trial court motions to suppress, and
as a result they have generated a considerable body of law. But neither question touches too
deeply on the core of Miranda's meaning, and certainly nowhere as deeply as the tumult that
would be caused by the so-called "fruits" cases discussed in the balance of this article.
27. 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971).
28. Justice Thomas made this point this Term in United States v. Patane, 124 S.Ct. 2620,
2628 (2004), discussed infra text accompanying notes 95-117. The Fourth Amendment, by
contrast, does not contain any language suggesting that evidence obtained in its violation should
necessarily be excluded. In this sense, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule created by
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-58 (1961), is substantially more adventurous, and strays much
farther from the constitutional text, than the exclusionary rule aspects of Miranda.
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coercive" nature of custodial interrogation and by specific techniques
touted in modern police manuals. Chief Justice Warren expressed
concern over police manuals that advised interrogating officers to do
their questioning at the police station in order to deprive the suspect
"of every psychological advantage," to "exude an air of confidence" in
order to "highlight the isolation," to "posit [the suspect's guilt] as a
fact," to "minimize the moral seriousness of the offense, to cast blame
on the victim of society," and generally "to put the subject in a
psychological state where his story is but an elaboration of what the
police purport to know already." 29 The majority adopted the warnings
regime, and its companion exclusionary rule, in an attempt to
eradicate this sort of police abuse.
But what about other prophylaxes? We know from Harris v.
New York that un-Mirandized but otherwise voluntary statements can
be used to impeach defendants who decide to testify, but can they be
used to lead police to other evidence-witnesses, subsequent
Mirandized statements, or physical evidence-that in other contexts
might be considered fruits of improper police conduct? 30 To the extent
the answers to these questions depend on characterizing the Miranda
exclusionary rule as a rule of constitutional import, or merely a
prophylactic, non-constitutional extension of the core protections of
the Fifth Amendment, the questions themselves go to the heart of the
Court's own conception of the basis for the rule and its willingness to
adhere to it.
In 1974, the Court faced this "fruits" question for the first time
in Michigan v. Tucker,3 1 a habeas corpus case in which the defendant's
state conviction was obtained with evidence from a witness whose
identity police discovered during an un-Mirandized but otherwise
voluntary interrogation of the defendant. The defendant argued that
his interrogation was "illegal" because he hadn't been Mirandized, and
therefore that all the fruits of that "illegal" interrogation should be
suppressed, including all the testimony from the witness. The Court,
by an impressive 8-1 majority, disagreed, and characterized the
un-Mirandized interrogation only as a departure from the
29. 384 U.S. at 449-50. With this rather mild description of the parade of modern
interrogation horribles, one can understand the dissenters' concern that the real target of the
majority's wrath was not unfair interrogations but any kind of interrogation at all. Moreover, as
mentioned supra note 20, Justice Clark pointed out in his separate dissent that there was no
evidence that even one of the police manuals relied on by the majority had actually been adopted
by any police department.
30. The analogy refers to the Fourth Amendment's fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. See,
e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (evidence procured after an illegal arrest
inadmissible).
31. 417 U.S. 433, 435-37 (1974).
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"prophylactic standards" set down in Miranda, and not as a violation
32
of the defendant's core privilege against self-incrimination.
The Court reached a similar result eleven years later in Oregon
v. Elstad,33 in which it refused to suppress a second, Mirandized,
statement as the fruit of a first, un-Mirandized, statement, holding
that the second statement could be admitted as long as it was
voluntary. The Court specifically held that the mere fact that the
police had failed to include in the Miranda warnings given prior to the
second statement advice that the first state was inadmissible did not
by itself render the second statement involuntary. Again, since the
Miranda warnings are merely prophylactic and their violation does
not necessarily give rise to a constitutional violation, a valid
34
advisement can cure a prior failure to advise.
The same "mere prophylaxis" approach drove the Court's
analysis in the 1975 case of Oregon v. Haas.35 In that case, the Court
extended the rule announced in Harris v. New York to circumstances
in which a defendant had been Mirandized, but whose statement was
elicited after his request for a lawyer was disregarded and questioning
32. Id. at 445-46. Actually, only six Justices took that approach; Justices Brennan and
Marshall concurred only in the result, and they based their concurrence on their view that
Miranda should not be applied retroactively. Id. at 455-56 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment). Only Justice Douglas opined that the witness's testimony was the fruit of an illegal
interrogation and should be suppressed. Id. at 463-64 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
33. 470 U.S. 298, 300 (1985).
34. Two important "fruits" questions were left open by Elstad. First, is the result the same
if the police intentionally decide not to give Miranda warnings before obtaining the first or
"beachhead" statement? Second, is the result the same if the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel attaches prior to the beachhead statement? The Court answered the first
question this Term in Seibert, discussed infra text accompanying notes 76-94. It seemed poised
to answer the second question, also this Term, in Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519 (2004).
Police questioned Fellers in his home, after he had already been indicted on methamphetamine
charges. Id. at 521. Although they told him about the indictment, they did not give him
Miranda warnings. Id. Fellers admitted knowing the other defendants and also admitted he had
methamphetamines. Id. Later, at the station, the police gave Fellers his Miranda warnings, he
waived his rights, and reiterated, in even more incriminating detail, his prior statement. Id. at
521-22. The Court declined to decide whether this case should be treated differently from
Elstad. Instead, it remanded it back to the Eighth Circuit because that court had erroneously
assumed that the Sixth Amendment had not been violated because Fellers had not been
"interrogated" in his home. Id. at 524-25. Because the Sixth Amendment is broader than the
Fifth Amendment and protects a defendant from any attempt "to deliberately elicit incriminating
statements," see United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270 (1980), the Court directed the Eighth
Circuit to reconsider the Sixth Amendment issue using the proper standard. Fellers, 540 U.S. at
525. On remand, the Eighth Circuit concluded that there was no Sixth Amendment violation,
noting that the initial statements were voluntary, that the police did not make any reference to
Feller's initial uncounseled statements when questioning him at the police station, and that the
questioning at the police station would have proceeded along the same lines even if Fellers had
made no initial statement to the police. United States v. Fellers, 397 F.3d 1090, 1098 (8th Cir.
2005).
35. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
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continued.
Such a defendant, if he chooses to testify, can be
impeached with the non-Mirandized statements notwithstanding the
fact that those statements were wrongfully elicited after the defendant
36
invoked his right to counsel.
Finally, in New York v. Quarles,37 the Court once again
emphasized the "prophylactic," non-constitutional nature of the
Miranda warnings when it created a public safety exception to
Miranda. In that case, police had information that an armed rapist
was in a grocery store. When they arrested him in the back of the
store, he had no gun on him. Without giving him any Miranda
warnings, police asked him where the gun was, and he pointed toward
some empty cartons on the floor, saying "The gun is over there."
Police found a loaded revolver in one of the empty cartons. A majority
of the Court permitted both the defendant's un-Mirandized statement
about the location of the gun, and the gun itself, to be admitted. As a
matter of public safety-in this case to prevent a loaded gun from
remaining somewhere in a grocery store open to the public-the
majority agreed that police could ask the defendant about the gun
38
without violating Miranda.
After Quarles, the non-constitutional pedigree of the Miranda
extension seemed firmly established, and many opponents spent the
ensuing years predicting that the Court would soon abandon Miranda
entirely. 39 When it finally agreed, in 2000, to entertain the question of
36. Id. at 722-23. Haas is a cross-examination version of the difficult fruits question the
Court avoided in Fellers, discussed supra notes 2, 34. Under Haas, a violation of the Miranda
right to counsel will not free a defendant to take the stand and testify, with impunity from
cross-examination, in a manner different from the voluntary statement he gave, even if the
statement was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Id. at 722-24. It is
difficult to see how a subsequent Miranda advisement and voluntary waiver-which, after all,
includes the waiver of the new-found Fifth Amendment right to counsel - would not likewise cure
a prior Sixth Amendment violation of the sort in Fellers.
37. 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984).
38. Justice O'Connor concurred only in the result, and wrote separately that it was
unnecessary to create a public safety exception in this case, because, in her view, the gun was
admissible in any event under the rule announced in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445
(1974). New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 660-64 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Citing
Tucker, she maintained that as long as statements taken in violation of Miranda were not used
at trial, the use of evidence derived from those statements was permissible. Id. at 663. This
issue of tangible fruits remained open until the Court's decision this Term in United States v.
Patane, discussed supra text accompanying notes 95-117.
39. See Daniel P. Collins, Farewell Miranda?, 1995 PUB. INT. L. REV. 185, 202-06 (1995)
(reviewing JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW (1993)) (stating that the
argument for overruling Miranda is persuasive); Alfredo Garcia, Toward an Integrated Vision of
Criminal ProceduralRights: A Counter to Judicialand Academic Nihilism, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 1,
25 (1993) (suggesting that the exception announced in Tucker will lead to Miranda's
abandonment); Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old
Days of Police Interrogation,48 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 742 (1987) (noting the Attorney General's
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whether Congress had the authority to overrule Miranda,virtually all
commentators-opponents and supporters alike-were poised for
Miranda's final demise. They would be surprised by the resilience of
the thirty-four-year-old case.
IV. THE MID-LIFE CRISIS: DICKERSON AND CHAVEZ

A. Dickerson v. United States
In Dickerson v. United States,40 the Court held, in a 7-2
decision written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, that despite all the
earlier cases labeling Miranda as a "prophylactic" extension of the
Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the rule was in
fact a rule of constitutional magnitude for purposes of deciding
whether Congress could overrule it. Dickerson dealt with a statute
intended in part to overrule Miranda in federal courts, passed by
Congress only two short years after Miranda was decided. The
legislation was the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968,41 and Title II purported to undo Miranda by making
voluntariness the sole issue for determining the admissibility of a
42
confession or statement in federal criminal cases.
The statute set out several factors that the federal judge
hearing the suppression motion could take into account in
determining the voluntariness issue, including whether the suspect
had been advised of his right to remain silent and of his right to
counsel. 43 But of course in declaring that none of those factors was to
doubt as to the need for Miranda); Scott Lewis, Miranda Out On a Limb, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Fall
1994, at 20, 60 (arguing that the Supreme Court seems poised to retreat from Miranda);
Kathleen A. Barry, Note, The Court Approves Ambiguous Miranda Warnings - Dims the "Bright
Line" of Pre-IndictmentProceduralRequirements, 15 S.ILL. U. L. J. 213, 233 (1990) (arguing that
the end result of the Court's efforts to "muddy" Miranda's "bright line" will be to abandon
Miranda completely); Steven A. Drizin, Note, Supreme Court Review: Fifth Amendment-Will
the Public Safety Exception Swallow the Miranda Exclusionary Rule?: New York v. Quarles, 75 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 692, 713-14 (1984) (suggesting that Quarles's public safety exception
will lead to Miranda's abandonment); Lisa Patrice Taylor, Note, Illinois v. Perkins: Balancing
the Need for Effective Law Enforcement Against a Suspect's ConstitutionalRights, 1991 WIS. L.
REV. 989, 1022 (suggesting that the exceptions to Miranda will come to swallow the rule).
40. 530 U.S. 428, 451 (2000).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968).
42. 18 U.C.S. § 3501(a) (1999). The statute provided that "in any criminal prosecution
brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession... shall be admissible
in evidence if it is voluntarily given." Id.
43. Id. at § 3501(b). Another of the listed factors would have had the effect of broadening
the voluntariness inquiry beyond its pre-Miranda boundaries. Section 3501(b)(2) expressly
permitted the trial court to consider whether the suspect knew the nature of the suspected
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be "conclusive on the issue of voluntariness," 44-and thus that a trial
court could find a confession voluntary even though a suspect received
no pre-interrogation warnings at all-the statute was a direct
45
challenge to Miranda.
In Dickerson, the Court held that Section 3501 was an
unconstitutional invasion of the Court's exclusive power to interpret
and apply the Constitution. 46
It also declined the defendant's
alternative request that Miranda be overruled.
Chief Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion, after conceding that "there is language
in some of our opinions" that supports the view that Miranda was a
non-constitutional exercise of the Court's supervisory powers over the
lower federal courts, 47 nevertheless relied on three arguments to
conclude that Miranda is a rule of constitutional law that Congress
cannot overrule: (1) the Miranda rule was announced in a state case,
not a federal case, and the United States Supreme Court has no
supervisory powers over state courts; (2) the Mirandamajority opinion
clearly relied on the Self-Incrimination Clause and announced that it
was giving "concrete constitutional guidelines" for law enforcement to
follow; and (3) the Miranda majority invited Congress to create
alternative protections against interrogative overreaching, but made it
clear that any such alternatives must meet or exceed the protections
provided by the rule announced by the Court.
The Dickerson majority admitted it had some doubts about the
reasoning of Miranda and even went so far as to question whether it
would reach the same result were it faced with the question for the

offense at the time of his interrogation, an inquiry that the Court had acknowledged as late as
1987 was virtually irrelevant to voluntariness. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577 (1987)
(holding that Miranda was not violated where a suspect was not informed of all possible
interogation subjects in advance).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b).
45. That it took more than thirty years for the challenge to Section 3501 to reach the Court
is testament to the fact that, for most of the intervening period, the Justice Departmentwhether under a Republican or Democrat administration-preferred to neglect the statute and
avoid a direct challenge to Miranda. For an excellent account of the way administrations from
Johnson through Clinton avoided Section 3501, see generally Michael Edmund O'Neill, Undoing
Miranda, 2000 BYU L. REV. 185, 210-32. Indeed, the Clinton Justice Department, in its briefs in
Dickerson, conceded that the statute was unconstitutional. Reply Brief of the United States,
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525).
46. 530 U.S. at 437 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517-21 (1997)). Had the
rule in Miranda been characterized only as a non-constitutional exercise of the Court's
supervisory authority over the lower federal courts, and in particular over the rules of evidence,
then Congress would have had the ultimate authority to displace it. Id.; see Palermo v. United
States, 360 U.S. 343, 353 n.ll (1959) ("[T]he power of this Court to prescribe rules of procedure
and evidence for the federal courts exists only in the absence of a relevant Act of Congress.").
47. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 438.
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first time. 48 But, in a much-quoted portion of the opinion, the Chief
Justice described the Mirandawarnings as having become "part of our
national culture," 49 hinted that precisely because they have become so
with legitimate police
they are not interfering
routine,
investigations,5 0 and concluded that traditional "voluntariness" under
the Due Process Clause is an ineffective substitute because it is more
difficult for police to "to conform to... and for courts to apply in a
consistent manner. 5 1
Yet the majority was completely silent on the impact of its
apparent re-constitutionalization of Miranda. Were Tucker, Harris,
Elstad, and Quarles being overruled? Was the Court returning to a
fully vigorous Miranda rule, and foreclosing all the past exceptions
and any future exceptions, or just putting a halt to future exceptions?
Or, even more narrowly, was it merely drawing a line between the
Court and Congress? Paul Cassell (now a federal district judge, but
then a law professor), whom the Court appointed in Dickerson to
argue the constitutionality of Section 3501 because the Clinton Justice
Department refused to do so, 5 2 wrote that when he first read the
53
decision, he asked himself, "Where's the rest of the opinion?"
In a scathing dissent, Justices Scalia and Thomas not only
rejected each of the majority's justifications, but accused it of
"writ[ing] a prophylactic, extraconstitutional Constitution, binding on
Congress and the States." 54 Most commentators, regardless of their
position on Miranda,chastised the Dickerson majority for its stubborn
refusal to harmonize Miranda with its prophylactic offspring. 55 If the

48. Id. at 443 ("Whether or not we would agree with Miranda's reasoning and its resulting
rule, were we addressing the issue in the first instance, the principles of stare decisis weigh
heavily against overruling it now").
49. Id.
50. Id. at 443-44. See supra note 21 for articles in which commentators discuss the
apparently paradoxical contention that "conservatives" should support Miranda and "liberals"
should oppose it, because it leaves police interrogation without meaningful regulation. Perhaps
the Chief Justice's opinion in Dickerson can be understood as an expression of this practical
perspective.
51. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444.
52. Cf. supra note 45.
53. Paul G. Cassell, The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court's Failures in Dickerson, 99
MICH. L. REV. 898, 898 (2001).

54. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 461.
55. See, e.g., Cassell, supra note 53, at 901; Susan R. Klein, Identifying and
(Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1071-77 (2001); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda,
Dickerson, and the Puzzling Persistence of Fifth Amendment Exceptionalism, 99 MICH. L. REV.
941, 941-44 (2001). These articles were part of an entire symposium issue in the Michigan Law
Review devoted to Dickerson and its impact on the law of confessions. See also, e.g, Yale
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Miranda warnings are constitutionally required (that is, if
un-Mirandized statements are "involuntary" in some constitutional
sense), then how can fruit from such statements be admissible? How
can such statements nevertheless be used to impeach testifying
defendants? Conversely, if the real reason fruits from un-Mirandized
statements are admissible, and testifying defendants can be
impeached with their un-Mirandized statements, is that the Miranda
warnings themselves are not constitutionally mandated, then why
can't Congress dispense with the warnings? Dickerson was not only
surprising in result, it reflected a surprising, even maddening,
unwillingness by a majority of the Court to acknowledge the
fundamental Miranda problem, in a case seemingly designed to force
56
such acknowledgment.
Because Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion commanded such a
large majority, and also because it was written by one of Miranda's
58
strongest critics, several commentators 57 and even a few courts
predicted that the Court would now undo many if not all of the
Tucker-to-Quarles restraints imposed on Miranda during its
"prophylactic" years, and revert to the much more vigorous

Kamisar, Miranda Thirty-Five Years Later:A Close Look at the Majority and Dissenting Opinions
in Dickerson, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387, 391-401 (2001).
56. Professor Klein was typical of the harshest Dickerson critics:
[W]hen squarely faced with the issue of whether the four Miranda warnings were
required by the federal constitution, [the Court] not only refused to answer coherently,
but breached its duty to provide a justification for Miranda or Dickerson and
squandered an opportunity to rationalize contradictory case law regarding Miranda's
exceptions.
Klien, supra note 55, at 1071.
57. See, e.g., Anthony X. McDermott & H. Mitchell Caldwell, Did He or Didn't He? The
Effect of Dickerson on the Post-Waiver Invocation Equation, 69 U. CINN. L. REV. 863, 928 (2001);
Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "'Overrule"Miranda?,
85 CORNELL L. REV. 883, 936-55 (2000).
58. Only one Circuit actually held that Dickerson overruled any of the prior Miranda
exceptions-the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1019-23 (2002), which,
of course, the Supreme Court reversed. See infra text accompanying notes 95-117. One other
Circuit mused, in dictum, about the possibility that Dickerson had overruled the prior Miranda
exceptions. Allen v. Roe, 305 F.3d 1046, 1050, n.4 (9th Cir. 2002). Only one district court and
one state supreme court reached that same result: United States v. Kruger, 151 F. Supp.2d 86,
101 (D. Me. 2001); State v. Knapp, 666 N.W.2d 881, 896-900 (Wis. 2003), vacated by 124 S.Ct.
2932 (2004). Every other reported decision addressing the issue concluded that Dickerson did
not displace any of the exceptions. See, e.g., United States v. Villalba-Alvarado, 345 F.3d 1007,
1011 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 219 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
536 U.S. 931 (2002); United States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176 (3rd Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535
U.S. 1028, 180 (2002); United States v. Orso, 266 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 828 (2002); United States v. Gilmore, No. 03-CR-0030-C-01, 2004 WL 602646, at *6
(W.D. Wis. Mar. 16, 2004); United States v. Bin Laden, No. S(7) 98 CR. 1023(LBS), 2001 WL
30061, at *3, n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2001); see also United States v. Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85, 94
(1st Cir. 2002) (tangible fruits not suppressed because underlying Miranda violation was only
negligent, not intentional).
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''constitutional form" of the opinion for which its original supporters
had argued. Alas, as if simply to confound the "Chicken Littles" on all
sides of the question, the Court decided in 2002 that Miranda was
once again just a "prophylactic" decision.
B. Chavez v. Martinez
In Chavez v. Martinez,59 the Court held, in a four-Justice
plurality opinion, that suspects in custody have no constitutional right
to be free of un-Mirandized interrogations, and thus that such
suspects have no claims under Section 1983 merely because police
officers interrogate them without giving them Miranda warnings.6 0
Police officers near Oxnard, California were questioning a man
about suspected drug trafficking when they noticed another man
approach on a bicycle. 6 1 They ordered the bicyclist, Mr. Martinez, to
stop and he complied. He also obeyed their commands to dismount, to
spread his legs and to place his hands on his head.
During a pat down search for weapons (during which a knife
was found), an altercation developed between Martinez and the
stopping officers. The officers testified that Martinez began to flee,
and they had to tackle him to prevent his escape. Martinez testified he
never tried to escape, and that the officers tackled him for no
justifiable reason. In any event, during this altercation, one of the
officers yelled, "He's got my gun," and in response another officer shot
Martinez several times, leaving him permanently blinded and
paralyzed from the waist down. Martinez was then arrested, without
being Mirandized.
Sergeant Ben Chavez, who was a patrol supervisor, arrived at
the scene together with several paramedics after the arrest. He
accompanied Martinez to a hospital emergency room where, without
Mirandizing him, he conducted a forty-five-minute interrogation, often
over the treating doctors' objections, 6 2 that focused on the central
59. 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
60. As discussed infra text accompanying notes 67-69, this plurality opinion was limited to
the so-called Miranda issue; the Court was just as badly split, along different lines, on the two
other issues it decided: whether the Self-Incrimination Clause applied at all since Martinez was
never charged with a crime; and whether Martinez had a § 1983 claim under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
61. Since there was no trial, these are the facts as developed at the hearing on the
cross-motions for summary judgment.
62. The Ninth Circuit noted that medical personnel on numerous occasions ordered
Sergeant Chavez to leave the emergency room, but that he remained, and would continue the
interrogation and turn his tape recorder back on whenever medical personnel temporarily left
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question of whether Martinez did in fact pull one of the other officers'
guns. Viewed in a light most favorable to Martinez, the interrogation,
which was taped and the full transcript of which was attached as an
appendix to the record, could be characterized as involving s
uggestions by Sergeant Chavez that he would continue to interrupt
Martinez's receipt of medical care unless Martinez confessed that he
had pulled the officer's gun and pointed it at her. Eventually, after
punctuating his responses with phrases that included "I am choking"
and "I am dying," Martinez admitted he pointed a gun at the police
63
before he was shot.
In a nuance that should have made the case easier, yet appears
to have made it much more difficult, Martinez was never charged with
a crime. He filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all the
officers, including Sergeant Chavez, asserting three claims for relief:
(1) that the officers illegally stopped him, (2) that the officers used
excessive force, and (3) that Sergeant Chavez coerced his confession.
Both sides filed cross motions for summary judgment. The
district court, after an evidentiary hearing, denied both sets of cross
motions on the no probable cause and excessive force claims, but
granted partial summary judgment (on liability) in favor of Martinez
on his claim that Sergeant Chavez coerced the confession. 64 Sergeant
Chavez filed an interlocutory appeal challenging that ruling.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that Martinez had a
constitutional right under the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to be free of coercive police interrogation despite the fact
that no criminal case was ever filed against him, and upholding the
65 It
district court's finding that the confession was in fact coerced.
further concluded that Martinez's confession claim was alternatively
cognizable as a violation of his right to substantive due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment, although Martinez never made that
66
argument either in district court or in the Ninth Circuit.
the room. Martinez v. City of Oxnard, 270 F.3d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 2001), reversed by sub. nom
Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2001). Presumably, this explains why the total interrogation
time was forty-five minutes but the taped portion lasted only ten minutes.
63. 538 U.S. at 764. Although Martinez eventually admitted pointing a gun, he never did
explicitly admit that he took the gun from the other officer.
64. The district court opinion was not published. The cross motions were raised in the
context of the defense of qualified immunity, with Sergeant Chavez claiming that he was
immune as a matter of law and Martinez claiming that there was no immunity as a matter of
law. The immunity issue, in turn, depended on whether Martinez demonstrated that he was
deprived of a "clearly established" constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 199 (2001).
It was in this context that the Ninth Circuit decided that citizens have a "right" not to be
coercively interrogated, and that the Supreme Court decided otherwise.
65. Martinez v. Oxnard, 270 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2001).
66. Id. at 857.
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The Supreme Court reversed, basing its decision on the two
issues discussed by the Ninth Circuit-whether the Self-Incrimination
Clause of the Fifth Amendment is violated by a coerced confession
when no criminal case is ever filed, and whether the confession in this
case violated substantive due process-and adding a third issue for
good measure-whether the failure to give Miranda warnings itself
was a constitutional violation, another claim Martinez had never
made either in the trial court or in the Ninth Circuit. The case
generated six separate opinions, none of which commanded a majority
on either of the Miranda issues.
In a plurality opinion written by Justice Thomas, joined by the
Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor and Scalia, the Court concluded
that Martinez had no Fifth Amendment claim at all-whether based
on the argument that the confession was coerced or merely on the
argument that it was un-Mirandized-because Martinez had never
been charged with a crime. 67 In another plurality opinion again
written by Justice Thomas, the Court concluded that Martinez did not
have a claim based on the lack of Miranda warnings because those
warnings are required only as a "prophylactic" matter and do not rise,
at the moment an un-Mirandized interrogation takes place, to the
level of a constitutional violation. 68 In a 5-3 opinion written by Justice
Souter, the Court concluded that Martinez might have a substantive
due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment and remanded
69
that claim for further proceedings.
The fractious opinions in Chavez reflect the Court's profound
and longstanding divisions over the meaning of the "core" of the
Self-Incrimination Clause and its "prophylactic" Miranda extensions.
Justice Thomas and those who concurred with him make a strong
textual case when they insist that the Self-Incrimination Clause has
nothing to do with this case because Martinez was never charged with
a crime. But of course neither had Ernesto Miranda been charged
with a crime as of the time of his confession. Once we accept
Miranda's axiom that the Self-Incrimination Clause is not limited to
the courthouse, there is no obvious reason it should be limited to
67. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 763. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg,
dissented from this portion of the opinion, claiming that a self-incrimination violation occurs the
moment a suspect is coerced into making a statement. Id. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 776.
69. Id. at 778-80. On remand, the Ninth Circuit concluded as a matter of law that
Sergeant Chavez's alleged conduct, if true, would violate Martinez's rights of substantive due
process, and therefore that Sergeant Chavez enjoyed no qualified immunity. Martinez v.
Oxnard, 337 F.3d 1091, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003). It remanded the case to the district court for trial
on the Section 1983 claim based on substantive due process, as well as on the no probable cause
and excessive force claims. Id.

830

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:3:813

circumstances in which a criminal case happens to be filed at a later
date, which is precisely what Justice Kennedy argues in his dissent to
70
this portion of the case.
Likewise, the plurality holding that the mere lack of Miranda
warnings is not in itself a constitutional violation is hard to explain
after Dickerson. Apparently, and with no principles to guide the Court
other than the arithmetic of its own internal divisions, Miranda
continues to be a non-constitutional "prophylactic" decision for all
purposes other than the question of who gets to decide whether to
keep it around. As we shall see in the Court's latest cases, that is
precisely the course that a shifting five-Justice majority has chosen.
Finally, Justice Souter's 5-3 opinion on the substantive due
process claim is remarkable only because three Justices dissented to
it. How can it be that a suspect, shot and paralyzed by police, whose
emergency room treatment has been arguably interrupted and will
continue to be interrupted unless he confesses, does not at least state
a claim for a violation of substantive due process? 71 Miranda's
confounding of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as we discuss
below, has not only blurred its supporters, to the limits of the Fifth
Amendment, it has also blurred its detractors to the reach of the
72
Fourteenth Amendment.
V.

SETTLING INTO A POST-CRISIS MATURITY: SEIBERT AND PATANE

In the first of the Court's 2004 Miranda cases, Missouri v.
Seibert,73 the Court began to confront the "fruits" questions left open
by Elstad.74 In the second, United States v. Patane,75 decided on the
70. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
71. Our rhetorical question makes the non-rhetorical assumption that there is such a thing
as substantive due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Although it does
appear that even the Court's strictest textualists-Justices Scalia and Thomas-have succumbed
at least to the precedential, if not doctrinal, view that the Constitution's reference to "due
process" embodies unarticulated substantive limitations on the power of the state, judges and
legal scholars alike remain divided over the legitimacy, and scope, of the doctrine. Compare
Mays v. East St. Louis, 123 F.3d 999, 1001 (7th Cir. 1997) (Easterbrook, J.) ("Substantive due
process is an oxymoron"), John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and The Constitutional Text,
83 VA. L. REV. 493, 495 (1997) (arguing there is little textual or historical support for the idea of
substantive due process), and ROBERT J. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 240 (1990) (same), with Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes:

Substantive Due Process, ProceduralDue Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833,
892 (2003) (arguing that Court should read the notion of substantive due process even more

broadly); Gregory C. Cook, Footnote 6: Justcie Scalia's Attempt to Impose the Rule of Law on
Substantive Due Process, 14 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 853 (1991) (same).
72. See infra text accompanying notes 117-134.
73. 124 S.Ct. 2601, 2613 (2004).
74. See supra note 34.
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same day, the Court answered the tangible fruits question left open by
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Quarles.76 Both cases confirm that
the Court remains inexplicably wedded to simultaneously preserving
the Mirandarule and all of its gutting exceptions.
A. Elstad Revisited
Seibert answered the question specifically left open in Elstad:
what if police intentionally fail to Mirandize suspects with the specific
purpose of getting them to confess, then Mirandize them and get them
simply to repeat the earlier confession? The Court refused to apply
Elstad in such circumstances, and thus created a kind of bad faith
exception to the Elstad exception.
Patrice Seibert was convicted of second degree murder in a
Missouri state court for her role in the death of Donald Rector, a
seventeen-year-old mentally handicapped boy who lived with Seibert
and her sons in a mobile home in Rolla, Missouri. One of Seibert's
sons-twelve year-old Jonathan-was also seriously handicapped and
died suddenly in his sleep. Afraid that police would accuse her of
neglect (a prudent fear, as Jonathan's body was covered in bedsores),
Seibert and her remaining sons decided to cover up Jonathan's death
by setting the mobile home on fire with Jonathan's body in it. But
because she might then be accused of neglect for leaving Jonathan
alone in the mobile home, Seibert and her sons decided they would set
the mobile home on fire while Donald Rector was still in it. Although
it was not clear whether all of the Seiberts had intended in advance
for Rector to die in the fire, the oldest son hit Rector on the head with
a bat while Rector was convulsing on the floor, then lit the trailer on
fire, and Rector did indeed die.
Five days after the fire, police arrested Seibert at a local
hospital, where she was visiting one of her sons who was being treated
for burns from the fire. She was taken to the police station and
interrogated
without any Miranda warnings.
Indeed,
the
interrogating officer's supervisor specifically directed him not to
advise Seibert of her Miranda rights during this first interrogation, in
the hope that they would be able to get an admission of guilt and then
follow that up with a Mirandized confession. That was exactly what
happened.
Seibert eventually admitted in the first interrogation-which
lasted fifteen to twenty minutes-that she knew the plan was for

75.
76.

124 S.Ct. 2620, 2629 (2004).
See supra note 38.
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Rector to die in the fire. Once this admission was obtained, and after
a twenty-minute break for coffee and a cigarette, Seibert was
Mirandized and, after a waiver was obtained, interrogated on audio
tape. During this second interrogation, with the officer occasionally
reminding Seibert of her earlier statements, Seibert again admitted
that she knew the plan was for Rector to die.
Relying on Elstad, the trial judge denied Seibert's motion to
suppress the taped statement, that statement was admitted in the
prosecution's case in chief, and Seibert was convicted of second degree
murder. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, also
77
relying on Elstad.
In a 4-3 decision, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the
conviction, concluding that the rule in Elstad cannot apply when the
police intentionally fail to Mirandize the first statement with the
express purpose of then locking the suspect into a second, Mirandized,
confession.78 Announcing that Miranda's twin purposes were the
suppression of untrustworthy testimony and the deterrence of
"improper," albeit not coercive, police conduct, and frequently citing
Justice Brennan's dissent in Elstad, the majority on the Missouri
Supreme Court held that police tactics designed to avoid the impacts
of Miranda are themselves the very sort of "misconduct" Mirandawas
designed to deter. "To hold otherwise," said the majority, "would
encourage future Miranda violations and, inevitably, Miranda's role
in protecting the privilege against self-incrimination would diminish."
79 It reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial without the
80
statements from either interrogation.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 8 ' and in a 5-4 decision
affirmed the Missouri Supreme Court, creating a kind of bad faith
77. State v. Seibert, No. 23729, 2002 WL 114804, at *9 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2002), vacated
by 93 S.W.3d 700, 707 (Mo. 2002).
78. State v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d 700, 704, 707 (2002).
79. Id. at 706-07.
80. The three dissenting justices relied on Elstad, and chided the majority for its conclusion
that the first un-Mirandized statement was designed "to weaken Seibert's ability to knowingly
and voluntarily exercise her constitutional rights." Id. at 709 (Benton, J., dissenting). In the
dissent's view, the only legitimate inquiry, given Elstad, was whether the first statement was
coerced in the old fashioned due process sense. Absent that, the dissent believed Elstad required
affirmance. Id. at 709-11.
81. Elstad had left open the question of whether a second Mirandized confession would still
be admissible if the police intentionally failed to Mirandize in the first interrogation, supra note
34, and in the intervening years the circuits had become split on this issue. Compare United
States v. Gale, 952 F.2d 1412, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (dictum) (deliberate "end run" around
Mirandawould not be permitted) and United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 373 (8th Cir. 1989)
(same), with United States v. Orso, 266 F.3d 1030, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (applying
Elstad despite intentional failure to Mirandize first statement) and United States v. Esquilin,
208 F.3d 315, 319-21 (1st Cir. 2000) (same).
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exception to the Elstad exception.
We say "kind of bad faith
exception" because the plurality opinion, written by Justice Souter
and joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, specifically resisted the
temptation to create a classic bad faith test focused on the subjective
intent of police. Instead, the plurality described the inquiry to be
made in any two-step interview situation as whether "the Miranda
warnings delivered midstream could have been effective enough to
accomplish their object" of truly rendering the second statement
voluntary, and not a mere regurgitation of the un-Mirandized first
statement.8 2 In making this determination, the plurality focused on
the external circumstances of the interrogations, rather than on the
subjective state of mind of the police.8 3 It listed factors such as
whether the two interrogations took place at the same place and were
performed by the same police personnel, the subject matter of the two
8 4
interrogations, and the time between the two interrogations.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy attempted to
articulate a more meaningful explanation of the tension between
Miranda and its exceptions-that is, more meaningful than the
axioms in Dickerson (Congress cannot overrule Miranda) and in the
plurality opinion (police cannot overrule Miranda). He argued that
the inquiry should be whether a given exception "further[s] important
objectives without compromising Miranda'scentral concerns. 8' 5 This
drives Justice Kennedy to propose a much more traditional, and
narrower, bad faith exception to Elstad: only where police are
intentionally using the two-step interrogation technique "in a
calculated way to undermine the Miranda warning" would Justice
Kennedy depart from the Elstad exception, and suppress the second,
86
Mirandized, statement.

82. Missouri v. Siebert, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 2612 (2004). Yet a strange kind of bad faith seems
to have crept into the plurality's opinion when it concluded the Missouri police engaged in "a
police strategy adapted to undermine the Miranda warnings." Id.
83. The Court has tried in other Fifth Amendment cases to avoid tests that focus
specifically on the subjective intent of the officers, presumably because such tests might be too
easy for police to manipulate to their advantage. Thus, for example, in Rhode Island v. Innis,
446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980), where the Court was faced with the issue of whether statements
between two police officers in their patrol car constituted "interrogation," the Court announced
that the test to be applied was whether the words or actions on the part of the police were such
that "the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect." The test did not ask specifically whether the police were attempting to get a response
from the suspect. William T. Pizzi, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in a Rescue
Situation, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 567, 581-82 (1985).
84.

Seibert, 124 S.Ct. at 2612-13.

85.
86.

Id. at 2614 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 2616.
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Justice Breyer concurred with the plurality result from exactly
the opposite direction. In his view, all fruits of un-Mirandized
statements-including second statements-should be presumed
inadmissible, and that presumption could be rebutted only by a
87
showing that the initial failure to warn was done in good faith.
The dissent was written by Justice O'Connor, joined by the
Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas. The central point of
O'Connor's dissent is that Miranda itself is grounded on the
assumption that the warnings work, and Elstad made it clear that,
despite an earlier violation, a suspect is no more "coerced" into
waiving his right to remain silent by an earlier statement than by the
inherently coercive nature of police interrogation in general. As she
put it, Elstad was precisely about the question of the "psychological
impact of the suspect's conviction that he has let the cat out of the
bag,"8 8 and that:
In Elstad, we refused to "endo[w] those psychological effects" with "constitutional
implications." [Citation omitted.] To do so, we said, would "effectively immuniz[e] a
suspect who responds to pre-Miranda warning questions from the consequences of his
subsequent informed waiver," an immunity that "comes at a high cost to legitimate law
enforcement activity, while adding little desirable protection to the individual's interest
in not being compelled to testify against himself."8 9

There are several interesting things about the opinions in
Seibert. First, the plurality opinion begins, unlike the Chief Justice's
opinion in Dickerson, with a detailed, almost nostalgic, recapitulation
of Miranda.90 It is clear, again unlike Dickerson, indeed despite
Dickerson, that a majority of Justices are re-engaging in a debate
about Miranda itself, a debate expected in Dickerson, but which never
came. For example, Justice Souter begins one section of his opinion
with this observation: "There are those, of course, who preferred the
old way of doing things, giving no warnings and litigating the
voluntariness of any statement in nearly every instance." 91
Also interesting, of course, is what appears to be the stirrings
of a new Miranda alignment on the Court, with Justice Kennedy now
wielding the fifth vote, and Justice O'Connor in the minority. When
was the last time Justice O'Connor was in the minority in a Miranda

87.
88.

Id. at 2613-14 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 2619 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 311

(1985)).

89. Id. (quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 312).
90. Id. at 2607-08.
91. Id. at 2608. This is a somewhat inaccurate suggestion, since even after Miranda,
defendants have been free to litigate the traditional voluntariness of their confessions, and in
fact, in the judge-author's experience, quite freely do so.

20051

TAKING MIRANDA'S PULSE

835

case? 92
Too much can be read into the tea-leaves of sheer
nose-counting, especially given Patane, which we discuss below and in
which Justice O'Connor was back again in her comfortable position of
defending both Miranda's core and its traditional exceptions. But
there can be no doubt that Seibert marks an important moment,
perhaps not so much because of Justice O'Connor's dissent, but
because of what she was dissenting against: both the plurality's
willingness to gut the Elstad exception beyond recognition, as well as
Justices Kennedy's and Breyer's willingness to inject the subjective
intentions of the interrogating police into the Miranda controversy.
In the end, we suggest that this latter point is what makes
Seibert potentially significant-a thin four-person plurality is
grudgingly willing to cut back on the Elstad exception and to enforce
Miranda's exclusionary rule in the two-interview situation under
certain limited circumstances (circumstances that will be easily
avoided by clever police), but is not quite yet willing to cast the whole
Elstad exception to the bad faith / good faith wolves. The focus has
remained on the suspect, and on the effect the first non-Mirandized
interview may have had on the voluntariness of the second statement.
With Justices Kennedy and Breyer now in the fold, the Court is
coming perilously close to recognizing a generalized bad faith
exception to the Miranda exceptions, 93 which could be the final straw
in any colorable attempt to keep the Miranda rule bounded by some
semblance of constitutional meaning.
Despite all the Miranda
waxings and wanings over the last forty years, the Fifth Amendment
is still about compulsion, and any self-incrimination inquiry into the
constitutionality of police interrogation must still be grounded in some
fashion, no matter how attenuated, on the voluntariness of the
confession. As Justice O'Connor put it, "voluntariness is a matter of
the suspect's state of mind, [so] we focus our analysis on the way in
which suspects experience interrogation. ... Thoughts kept inside a
police officer's head cannot affect that experience." 94

92. The answer is that Justice O'Connor has never been in the minority in any significant
Miranda case. She was the fifth, and occasionally sixth, vote in all the exceptions cases decided
since her appointment and she voted with the majority in the Dickerson retrenchment, and voted
with the majorities, at least as to the results, in all three of the partial opinions in Chavez v.
Martinez..
93. Or, in Justice Breyer's case, to recognize a good faith exception to a complete
undoing of the Mirandaexceptions. Seibert, 124 S.Ct. at 2613.
94. Id. at 2617 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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B. Tangible Fruits
In the last of the new cases, United States v. Patane,95 the
Court again addressed the "fruits" issue. This time it tackled the
problem of tangible fruits, a problem it had managed to dodge for
thirty-eight years. The Court held, in accordance with the result
Justice O'Connor had suggested in her concurrence in Quarles,96 that
tangible fruits are no different than any other kind of Miranda "fruit,"
and that the Tucker-Elstad rule applies to admit such fruits despite
97
the failure to Mirandize.
The case initially arose when two police officers in Colorado
Springs, Colorado, went to the residence of Samuel Patane to arrest
him for violating a restraining order that prohibited him from
contacting his ex-girlfriend. 98
One of the officers, Detective Josh
Benner, had received information from an agent of the federal Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms that Patane was in possession of a
Glock pistol. After reaching the residence and inquiring into the
violation of the restraining order, the other officer placed Patane
under arrest. 99 At this point, Detective Benner began to give Patane
his Miranda warnings, but after informing him of his right to remain
silent, Patane interrupted Benner, stating that he knew his rights,
and neither officer completed the full set of Miranda warnings. 100
Detective Benner then asked Patane about the Glock.101
Patane was initially reluctant to discuss the matter because, he told
Detective Benner, "I don't want you to take it away from me." 10 2 But
Benner persisted, and Patane eventually told Benner that the gun was
in his bedroom. 103 He then gave Benner permission to retrieve the
04
pistol, which Benner did. 1
Patane was booked on state charges of violating the restraining
order.105 After the police confirmed that Patane had a prior felony

95.
96.
97.
that the
82-86.
98.
99.
100.
101.

124 S.Ct. 2620 (2004).
See supra note 38.
United States v. Patane, 124 S.Ct. 2620, 2628 (2004). Assuming, pursuant to Seibert,
failure to Mirandize did not seem to be intentional. See supra text accompanying notes
Id. at 2624.
Id. at 2625.
Id.
Id.

102. Id.

103. Id.
104. Id.

105. Id.
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drug conviction, he was also charged in federal court with possession
10 6
of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
At his federal trial, the district court suppressed the gun
because it concluded police lacked probable cause to arrest him on the
restraining order charge. 10 7 For that reason, there are no district court
findings specific to the self-incrimination issues. The Tenth Circuit
reversed the district court on the probable cause issue, and it then
concluded that the gun should nevertheless be suppressed as fruit of
the Miranda violation.10 8 It reasoned (without the benefit of Chavez)
that Dickerson impliedly overruled Elstad and all the other "fruits"
cases, and that because Miranda violations are now of constitutional
magnitude, the tangible fruits of those constitutional violations must
now be suppressed. 10 9
The Supreme Court reversed in an opinion written by Justice
Thomas, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia, and in which
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy concurred. This five-Justice majority
rejected the Tenth Circuit's holding that Dickerson wiped out the
traditional Mirandafruits exceptions, and it did so in an opinion that
used the word "prophylactic" no less than six times. Miranda may
itself be a rule of constitutional import, but the majority held that "the
closest possible fit must be maintained between the Self-Incrimination
Clause and any rule designed to protect it."110 It concluded that,
because the Fifth Amendment traditionally has not applied to
non-testimonial evidence,"' there was no reason to create a
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 304 F.3d 1013, 1023 (10th Cir. 2002), reversed by 124 S.Ct. 2620 (2004).
109. Id. at 1029. The Tenth Circuit, in Patane, was the only Circuit to hold that Dickerson
displaced any of its "mere prophylactic" predecessors. See supra note 58.
110. 124 S.Ct. 2628.
111. The dissenters quite properly labeled this proposition "an overstatement." Id. at 2631
(Souter, J., dissenting). The line between "testimonial" and "non-testimonial" evidence has not
always been easy to draw. See, e.g., United States v. Fisher, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976) (the very
act of producing documents can sometimes have "communicative aspects" quite apart from
contents). This so-called "act of production" doctrine was reaffirmed in United States v. Hubbell,
530 U.S. 27 (2000), although in a concurring opinion Justices Scalia and Thomas suggested it
should be re-examined in light of the history of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 49-55 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). These two Justices suggest that there is evidence that the word "witness" in the
Self-Incrimination Clause was never intended to be limited to testimony, and that a "witness" is
anyone who gives evidence of any kind, whether testimonial or non-testimonial (e.g., physical
evidence). Id. at 49 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For discussions of the act-of-production doctrine,
and of the suggestions by Justices Scalia and Thomas in their Hubbell concurrence, see generally
Richard Nagareda, Compulsion "To Be a Witness" and the Resurrection of Boyd, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1575 (1999) (arguing that textual, historical, and doctrinal grounds exist to show that the
Fifth Amendment's phrase "to be a witness" is synonymous with "to give evidence"); see also
Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination
Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 883-89 (1995) (describing the Supreme Court's movement away
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prophylactic extension of Miranda to exclude non-testimonial evidence
obtained pursuant to an otherwise voluntary statement.
Justice Thomas concluded the plurality opinion by noting that
exclusionary rules in general are premised on the proposition that
certain police conduct must be deterred. Since the core of the Fifth
Amendment is self-executing, the plurality argued that there simply is
nothing to deter in these Miranda cases. Traditional coercion-by
torture, or gross deception-is deterred by the traditional
voluntariness inquiry, which not only excludes involuntary statements
but their fruit as well. 112 But, said the plurality, there is no
constitutional violation the moment the police interrogate a custodial
suspect without Mirandizing him; 113 the Fifth Amendment violation
occurs only when the un-warned statement is used at trial. 114 The
Court need not concern itself with fashioning rules to insure that
police give the Miranda warnings, because the real deterrent is in the
Fifth Amendment itself, not any deterrence in the form of prophylactic
extensions of Miranda.
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor concurred in the first two of
the plurality's conclusions-that Dickerson did not overrule Tucker
and Elstad, and that those exceptions should apply to tangible fruitsbut found gratuitous the plurality's observations that Miranda itself is
not "violated" when police fail to Mirandize suspects, and that there is
nothing to deter as long as the un-Mirandized statement itself is not
used at trial. Their opinion focused instead on the "important
probative value of physical evidence," and concluded that any
marginal deterrent benefit is outweighed by that probative value. 1 5
There were two separate dissents, one written by Justice
Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, and one written by
Justice Breyer. Justice Souter chastised the majority for its failure to
recognize the fundamental insight of Miranda: police interrogation is
inherently coercive, and un-Mirandized statements are presumptively
coercive. Justice Souter argued that in order to protect these twin
pillars from clever police erosion, all derivative evidence obtained from
an un-Mirandized statement must also be considered presumptively
from an "over-expansive view of the word witness" that included personal documents to its
current distinction between words and physical evidence).
112. Patane,124 S.Ct.at 2627-28 (citing New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979) (holding
the fruits of testimony compelled by grant of immunity inadmissible)).
113. Id. at 2628. This is the critical issue upon which the Chavez Court was so divided. See
supra text accompanying notes 66-72.
114. Id. at 2628-29. As Justice Thomas stated: "The Miranda rule is not a code of police
conduct, and police do not violate the Constitution (or even the Mirandarule, for that matter) by
mere failures to warn." Id. at 2626.
115. Id. at 2631 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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inadmissible. 116 Under the plurality's rule, these dissenters argue,
police will have an irresistible incentive to interrogate suspects
without giving the Miranda warnings, in the hope of learning about
the location of physical evidence.
Justice Breyer's separate dissent makes the point he made in
his separate concurrence in Seibert: there should be a presumption
that all fruit from un-Mirandized statements is to be excluded, unless
the failure to Mirandize was in good faith. 117 Because no court had yet
ruled on the question of whether the officers acted in good faith in
interrupting the warnings when Mr. Patane told them to stop because
he knew the rest, Justice Breyer would remand the case for such a
determination.
Just when we thought Dickerson, and even the plurality
opinions in Chavez, had spackled over the Court's deepest Miranda
divisions, here, less than four years later, we have the old fissures,
combined with some new ones, surfacing with a vengeance. This in a
case that easily could have been decided as a rather narrow extension
of, or refusal to extend, Elstad. It is difficult to know what to make of
the three opinions in Patane.
The plurality is saying what Justices Scalia and Thomas have
been saying in every Mirandacase for at least a decade: the rule is a
non-constitutionally-required, judge-made extension that we should
extend no more. The Chief Justice's concurrence in that plurality
opinion is nothing short of amazing, in light of his opinion in
Dickerson. All we can say about the Chief Justice's place in the
current debate about Miranda is that he accepts the textualist
argument when it comes to putting a halt to expanding Miranda, but
rejects that same argument when it comes to getting rid of Miranda
entirely.
Similarly, the dissenters have stayed fairly consistent:
Miranda was a constitutional decision, the warnings are
constitutionally required, and fruit from unconstitutional police
behavior (interrogating without the warnings) must be suppressed to
deter that behavior. The only nuance from the dissenters is Justice
Breyer's continued insistence that the police officer's good faith should
be the only exception.
The separate concurrence by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy
is, not surprisingly, the most difficult to gauge, precisely because that
116. Id. at 2632 (Souter, J., dissenting). As he said at the end of his dissent: "There is no
way to read this case except as an unjustifiable invitation to law enforcement officers to flout
Miranda when there may be physical evidence to be gained. The incentive is an odd one, coming
from the Court on the same day it decides Missouri v. Seibert, ante." Id.
117. Id. at 2632-33 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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concurrence straddles the elephant that has been living in the
Miranda house since its inception. Some thought the elephant was
gone after Dickerson, but it has cheerfully retaken its place smack in
the middle of the self-incrimination living room with Patane. Are the
Miranda warnings constitutionally required or not? As a technical
matter, of course, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy are correct that the
plurality's observations on this core issue were not necessary to the
result in the case. By continuing to avoid this question, these two
Justices can continue to avoid the underlying questions it suggests:
Was Miranda itself correctly decided? In other words, does the Fifth
Amendment compel the result in Miranda? Or is Miranda itself just
another non-constitutional prophylaxis?
VI. DIAGNOSIS

A. Confounding Self-Incrimination With Due Process
We believe Miranda'smost debilitating congenital defect is not
its constitutional illegitimacy or its empirical failures, though those
conditions are certainly disabling the patient and justify the continued
restrictions imposed by a shifting five-Justice majority. Rather, we
suggest that Miranda's most dangerous birth defect is its hopeless
confounding of self-incrimination with due process, an ironic
confounding indeed, because the whole Mirandaconstruct was born of
the Court's increasing skepticism about whether due process would be
an effective tool to combat what it believed was a new, or at least
newly unacceptable, strain of police overreaching.
Mongrelizing these two constitutional protections has become a
substantial drag on the jurisprudence of confessions and has produced
consistently dissonant opinions that have obscured their two very
different policies. The Court seems confused about Mirandaprecisely
because no consistent majority has ever fashioned a consensus about
the interrelationship, or more to the point, the lack of a relationship,
between self-incrimination and substantive due process.
Suppressing coerced confessions as a matter of traditional
substantive due process advances two policies: maintaining the
reliability of confessions and discouraging unacceptable police
conduct. Both of these policies explain the reach, and the limitations,
of the pre-Mirandalaw of coerced confessions. We can probably all
agree that confessions extracted under torture tend not to be as
reliable as voluntary confessions.
On the other hand, precisely
because we probably all agree about that, including those of us who
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end up as jurors, a case could be made that if reliability were the only
policy behind suppressing coerced confessions, the jury should still
hear about the coerced confession and make its own mind up about
reliability. Reliability alone does not explain the rule that coerced
confessions must be suppressed.
Instead, due process, especially substantive due process, also
protects the dignity of the individual. 118 Whether or not a statement is
reliable, we simply cannot tolerate situations in which police extract
coerced confessions from citizens in the hope that a jury might believe
the confession notwithstanding the torture, or, more likely, in the
hope that the torture will lead to other inculpatory evidence. So we
suppress coerced confessions, and all the fruits of those confessions,
under the Due Process Clause, quite apart from our sense of the
reliability of such confessions.
As modern notions of "coercion" expanded beyond physical
torture, the paths of these two distinct due process policies began to
diverge. We recognize that extracting a confession by deceit, trickery
or other kinds of police misconduct resulting in "involuntary"
confessions, may not affect the reliability of those confessions, but we
still suppress confessions in some of the most extreme cases because
we do not want our police acting in these extreme ways. 119 The
converse is also true: some kinds of police trickery, though not rising
to the level of unacceptable police misconduct, may be of the type

118. See supra text accompanying note 17.
119. For example, we might make the judgment that lying about forensic test results is
conduct we will not tolerate from our police, and thus suppress confessions elicited by such
misrepresentations, even though we do not believe that such confessions are particularly
unreliable. After all, are innocent people, at least those blessed with average mental powers and
whose mental condition at the time of the crime was not subverted by drugs or alcohol, really
going to confess to a crime they did not commit just because the police say they have a DNA
match? Yet most courts strike the balance in these kinds of cases toward reliability rather than
toward the prevention of intolerable police misconduct irrespective of reliability, and admit
confessions produced in such circumstances. See, e.g., Lucero v. Kirby,133 F.3d 1299, 1311-12
(10th Cir. 1998) (confession admitted despite police lie about finding suspect's fingerprints at
crime scene); Ledbetter v. Edwards, 35 F.3d 1062, 1068-70 (6th Cir. 1994) (same); People v.
Thompson, 785 P.2d 857, 874-77 (Cal. 1990) (confession admitted despite police lies about
fingerprints and DNA evidence); State v. Jones, 566 N.W.2d 317, 326 (Minn. 1997) (confession
admitted despite police lies about having crime on surveillance video tape).
Since the
voluntariness inquiry is plenary, there are also cases in which courts have concluded that police
misrepresentations about evidence, coupled with other factors, cross the boundary into
involuntariness.
See, e.g., People v. Freeman, 668 P.2d 1371, 1379-80 (Colo. 1983)
(misrepresentations about evidence, coupled with misrepresentations about potential
punishment and use of 'Mutt and Jeff' routine to alternately berate and reassure suspect,
rendered confession involuntary). See generally Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing
Confessions, 127 PENN. L. REV. 581 (1979) (suggesting that several widely used interrogation
tactics should be prohibited because they create unacceptable risks that a suspect's Sixth
Amendment rights will be violated and voluntariness compromised).
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likely to produce a false confession. Such confessions we might also
120
label "involuntary" under the due process clause and suppress.
The Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause serves very
different purposes, however. Although we are prone to incant the
self-incrimination privilege as a categorical good, its real place in the
firmament of our criminal justice system is a matter of great
controversy. Many commentators have complained that metaphor and
slogans have often substituted for a comprehensive and critical
examination of the true policies behind the privilege against
self-incrimination. 1 21 Akhil Reed Amar and Renee Lettow have called
it "a mandate in search of a meaning." 122 But few of the traditional, or
even non-traditional, rationales for the privilege have much to do with
the reliability of compelled testimony, at least once we move beyond
the idea that the language of the clause is somehow limited to
prohibiting torture. 123 Indeed, as mentioned above, the original
meaning of "compulsion" in the Self-Incrimination Clause was simply
that a defendant, unlike any other witness, could not be forced to
testify under threat of contempt. 24 Yet we force other witnesses,

120. One example of this converse situation is when police lie about the seriousness of an
offense. There is a continuum between police officers' general statements about punishment (or
even mistakes driven by a lack of a nuanced understanding of the sentencing laws) and outright
lies about potential punishment, and reasonable judges might disagree about whether lying
about the law is necessarily intolerable police conduct in any given context. Compare State v.
Stanislaw, 573 A.2d 286, 295 (Vt. 1990) (police told suspect arrested for providing liquor to a
minor resulting in death, "it's not like being a real criminal"), with Nebraska v. Walker, 493
N.W.2d 329, 334-35 (Neb. 1992) (police told statutory rape suspect that it is not a crime if the
victim consented). But when the lie might lead an innocent person to believe that the crime is
not serious (or not even a crime), and therefore might lead an innocent person to confess, we
might expect that the statements will be suppressed. It seems, however, that such confessions
are routinely admitted, quite apart from the profundity of the legal misrepresentation. See id.;
People v. Hill, 839 P.2d 984, 994-95 (Cal. 1992) (police never told defendant the crime he was
suspected of committing carried possible death penalty); Douglas v. State, 481 N.E.2d 107, 11112 (Ind. 1985) (misrepresentations about leniency and the place of incarceration); State v.
Cooper, 217 N.W.2d 589, 592 (Iowa 1974) (police lied when they told suspect that victim was still
alive); see also White, supra note 119, at 593-94 (discussing three concerns of admissibility: 1)
the abhorrence of convictions based on unreliable confessions; 2) the feeling that police
interrogation methods should not put an intolerable degree of pressure on a suspect; and 3) a
belief that such practices should uphold the standards of fairness inherent in our justice system).
121. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 10, at 2665 ("[The history of the privilege against
self-incrimination seems to reveal the real tyranny of slogans."); John H. Langbein, The
Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047, 1083-84
(1994) (discussing the historical error of assuming the slogan nemo tenetur prodere seipsum
created the privilege against self-incrimination); Amar & Lettow, supra note 111, at 893 ('These
phrases, however, are more like slogans that simply restate the rule than carefully considered
rationales.").
122. Amar & Lettow, supra note 111, at 922.
123. See infra text accompanying note 126.
124. See supra note 10.
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including eyewitnesses who would rather not give evidence, to testify
all the time under threat of contempt, without worrying about
whether the act of forcing them infects the reliability of their
testimony. We even require witnesses who would otherwise have the
right to invoke the privilege against self incrimination to testify when
we grant them immunity. 125
Thus the Founders cannot have been
126
worried about the reliability of compelled testimony.
They certainly were not worried about police overreaching, for
the same reasons. Judges-who might hold a criminal defendant in
contempt for refusing to testify-seem to have been the Founders'
original targets, not the police.
In the end, the original American justification for the privilege
against self-incrimination seems almost tautological: we simply will
not force criminal defendants to help the prosecution prove its case by
requiring them to testify and face the so-called "cruel trilemma" of
being jailed for refusing to testify, perjuring themselves, or
confessing.127
125. The immunity granted persons forced to testify need only be "use immunity," which
protects the witness against the use of the testimony and its fruits; it need not be "transactional
immunity," which would bar the witness from ever being prosecuted for the crime in question.
This limitation on the scope of Fifth Amendment protection was established in Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). The Court in Kastigar noted both the long history of
immunity statutues as well as the fact that every state has such a statute. Id. at 445-47. The
Court observed that these statutes "reflect the importance of testimony and the fact that many
offenses are of such a character that the only persons capable of giving useful testimony are
those implicated in the crime." 406 U.S. at 446.
126. Actually, there is virtually nothing in the historical record-pre-ratification,
post-ratification or in the ratification debates themselves-about the Founders' views of the Fifth
Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause, and that vacuum of information has been a large part
of the paradox of self-incrimination. There were occasional mentions of individual state bans on
self-incrimination, or the lack of such bans, in the context of prohibiting torture, but nothing that
might explain, on the one hand, why the Founders chose language that on its face is clearly not
limited to torture, or that would suggest, on the other hand, any deeper or more expansive
rationales for the privilege. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 429-32 (1968) (noting the lack of historical evidence from
the time of the drafting of the Bill of Rights with regard to privilege against self-incrimination).
127. The "cruel trilemma" slogan was coined by Justice Goldberg in Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). We sympathize with critics who quite rightly point out that the
cruel trilemma is really only "cruel" for guilty defendants, and who believe that the system's
truth-finding function should trump any policy grounded in a kind of quaint notion of
sportsmanship toward the guilty. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & M. Kristin Mace, The Self
Incrimination Clause Explained and its Future Predicted, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243,
245 (2004); Amar & Lettow, supra note 111, at 890.
Indeed, other Western democracies strike the balance in quite a different way. In England,
when a suspect is arrested, the failure of the suspect to give an account to the police of certain
suspicious circumstances, such as the suspect's presence near the scene of the crime or his
possession of any object that may link him to the crime, can result in an adverse inference at
trial. See Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33, §§ 34, 36, 37 (Eng.). Also, the
caution given suspects in England is very different from the Miranda warnings. Suspects are
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Whatever its purposes, the Self-Incrimination Clause seems to
have nothing to do with the twin evils posed by coerced confessionsunreliability and police overreaching. It is therefore no surprise that
until Miranda,those evils were addressed first under the common law
and later under the Due Process Clause, two approaches whose
inherent flexibility are perfectly matched, at least in theory, to
gradually evolving standards of "coercion" and to the constantly
128
morphing problem of police overreaching.
By mixing up the truth-finding and anti-overreaching policies
behind the Due Process Clause's traditional voluntariness inquiry
with the decidedly truth-indifferent and overreaching-indifferent
policies of the Self-Incrimination Clause, the Miranda Court created a
hybrid with the worst aspects of both. Thus, in the fruits cases, the
Court has drawn an astonishingly arbitrary line between, on the one
hand, voluntary but un-Mirandized confessions, which it will suppress
to deter police even though the confessions were not "coerced," and, on
the other hand, all the fruits of those confessions, which apparently do
not need to be suppressed. It turns out, in the strange world of
Miranda, that suppressing the un-Mirandized statement itself, but
not any of its fruits, applies just enough prophylaxis to protect the
core
privilege
against self-incrimination.
Likewise, in the
cross-examination cases, suppressing un-Mirandized statements only
in the prosecution's case in chief turns out to be just the right amount
of prophylaxis; suppressing them for impeachment purposes is
apparently unnecessary overkill that will unduly interfere with a
truth-finding process that must accommodate a criminal defendant's
incentive to lie on the witness stand.
told: "You do not have to say anything. But it may harm your defence if you fail to mention when
questioned something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in
evidence." ARCHBOLD CRIMINAL PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE 2004 § 15-295.

In civil law countries, defendants are expected to participate in their own trial. The trial
begins with the presiding judge asking the defendant to respond to the charges, which will have
been read or summarized by the state's attorney. While the defendant does not need to respond,
and while there is in some countries a formal prohibition against the fact finders drawing
adverse inferences from such a refusal, almost all defendants choose to give evidence in
continental systems because of the realistic concern that such inferences will be drawn anyway.
See William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: The
Difficulties of Building an Adversarial System on a Civil Law Foundation, 17 YALE J. INT'L. L. 1,
7-10 (1992); Mirjan Dama~ka, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal
Procedure:A Comparative Study, 121 U. PENN. L. REV. 506, 527 (1973)
But of course in the United States, the constitutional horse is out of that barn. Just as
Professor Alschuler may lament that the Founders did not go far enough to protect the common
law "right to remain silent," see supra note 10, others may lament that the Founders went too
far. Neither lamentation helps very much in interpreting the Self-Incrimination Clause in a way
that does justice to its words in a sensible and predictable manner.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20.
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Miranda's confounding of due process and self-incrimination
may also have had drastically unintended consequences. As
mentioned above, some commentators have argued that, because the
Due Process Clause is a much more malleable and therefore more
effective tool to regulate police conduct, Miranda's tie to the much less
flexible Self-Incrimination Clause has left police interrogation largely
unregulated. 129 As Professor Stuntz has so elegantly noted, "Miranda
imposes only the slightest of costs on the police, and its existence may
well forestall more serious, and more successful, regulation of police
13 0
questioning."
B. DisentanglingSelf-Incriminationfrom Due Process
One way to understand all the Miranda exceptions is to
disentangle Miranda's self-incrimination and due process strains.
Indeed, most of the prophylactic cases make perfect sense if one thinks
of them only as traditional due process cases, and ignores the
inexplicable self-incrimination platform upon which they have been
launched.
Does failing to give Miranda warnings make otherwise
voluntary confessions less reliable? Of course not. Does failing to give
Miranda warnings rise to the level of police misconduct we simply
should not tolerate in a civilized society? Of course not. Thus, per
Harris, it is perfectly appropriate to use un-Mirandized, but
voluntary, statements to impeach defendants, especially to counter the
evils of perjury. Per Tucker and Elstad, it is perfectly appropriate to
admit fruits of an un-Mirandized, but voluntary, statement. Per
Quarles, who would say police are violating due process when, by
using entirely non-coercive questions, they try to find a loaded gun in
131
a grocery store?
Chavez v. Martinez is probably the best case to illustrate our
point, because it explicitly involved both self-incrimination and due
process claims. The plurality went out of its way (in dictum) to tell us
that the "right to remain silent" created in Miranda is not really a
constitutional right giving rise to a damage claim.132 Again, in due
129. See supra note 21.
130. Stuntz, supra note 21, at 976.
131. The perplexing disconnect of Quarles remains: creating a "public safety" exception was
necessary only if the failure to give Miranda warnings is itself a constitutional violation. If we
accept the view of the Chavez plurality that police have no positive constitutional obligation to
Mirandize suspects, then they were free to ask Mr. Quarles where the gun was and quite free to
eliminate the threat to public safety by removing the gun from the store, whether or not the gun
gets admitted into evidence or gets suppressed.
132. Chavez v. Martinez, 530 U.S. 760, 773 (2003).

846

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:3:813

process terms, interrogating suspects without first Mirandizing them
is not likely to lead to unreliable confessions and is also not the kind of
police misconduct we want to discourage either with the cleaver of the
exclusionary rule or the slightly more refined dagger of damage
claims.
But the kind of substantive coercion that took place in Chavez
is something we should not tolerate as a due process matter, for both
of the traditional reasons. Confessions coerced by police who threaten
to interfere with medical treatment are unacceptably unreliable, and,
quite apart from their unreliability, few of us want to live in a society
where police are permitted to behave in this way. Thus, in a different
(majority) opinion, five Justices held that the facts in Chavez stated a
claim for a substantive due process violation, though not a
self-incrimination violation.
The two new cases are also completely sensible if viewed only
as due process cases. In Seibert, the Court said, in effect, that the
intentional two-step approach is intolerable police conduct, at least in
a society that continues to pay lip service to the Mirandawarnings. It
is not that the two-step interrogation is unacceptably unreliable,
although we concede that if the first statement has any stain of
unreliability from the "inherently coercive" interrogative atmosphere,
it may be marginally more difficult for the warnings to remove that
stain after the suspect is locked into the first statement. But in a
world where we pretend to believe that the mantra of the warnings
will magically overcome an entire culture of police coercion, it seems
strange to believe that those same warnings will not be able to
unleash a suspect's ability to change his story from an inherently
coerced inculpatory lie to the un-coerced exculpatory truth.
If reliability were actually at the heart of Seibert, we would
have to believe that people are more "coerced" by their own need to be
consistent than by the full coercive power of the entirety of the police
apparatus. Even if that were true, such "self-coercion," as Justice
O'Connor so pointedly observed, is simply not the kind of coercion
133
forbidden by the Fifth Amendment.
No, it seems Seibert is best explained as a case about intolerable police misconduct, though a special kind of intolerable police misconduct. Not the kind that impinges on the dignity of the individualby torturing him, or tricking him or forcing him to testify-but rather
the kind that impinges on the dignity of the Court as the final arbiter
of constitutional principles. Justice Souter stated bluntly in the concluding paragraph of the plurality opinion: "Strategists dedicated to
133. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
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draining the substance out of Miranda cannot accomplish by training
instructions what Dickerson held Congress cannot do by statute." 134
Due process also explains Patane. There simply is no due
process distinction between tangible fruits and any other kind of
fruits. It is the nature of the interrogation that matters, not the
nature of the products from that interrogation. The way in which Mr.
Patane was interrogated created no risk either of a false confession or
of police overreaching.
There was no trickery or other police
misconduct to suggest that Mr. Patane did not really know he had a
gun in his bedroom but was deceived into saying he did. And who
could say that the interrogation in Patane was fundamentally unfair,
where Mr. Patane interrupted the advisement by saying he knew all
his rights, 135 and where the object of the interrogation was to remove a
gun from the scene of a recurring domestic dispute?
VII. PROGNOSIS
What does all of this mean for the long-term fate of Miranda?
We agree with most post-Dickerson commentators that Miranda is
here to stay for the foreseeable future, though our reasons for that
prognosis differ from most.
We contend that, despite the self-incrimination veneer, these
cases confirm that Miranda's limitations and extensions will continue
to be driven by the very same two-part inquiry that animated
traditional voluntariness: (1) is the statement likely to be unreliable
(the answer to this is almost always "no" when we are talking only
about the lack of warnings) and (2) does the police misconduct rise to
the level of a substantive due process violation quite apart from any
impact it might have on reliability? If the answer to either of these
questions is "yes," then Miranda wll be extended and the confession
or secondary evidence will be suppressed; otherwise, the Miranda
advisements will be labeled "prophylactic" and the confession or
136
secondary evidence will not be suppressed.
Of course, the current Court is unlikely ever to accept such a
recasting of Miranda into this traditional kind of due process inquiry.
134. Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 2613 (2004).
135. What if Mr. Patane had said, "You don't need to tell me my rights. I know all of them.
Let me recite them for you," and he proceeded to do so, in perfect fashion? Would anyone but the
most irrationally orthodox Miranda formalist suppress either the statement or the gun in that
situation?
136. That is, we suggest that the Court has actually adopted, without admitting it, the
suggestion of the Mirandacritics who have argued that police interrogation should be regulated
within the more flexible due process paradigm than under formalistic "extensions" and
"limitations" of Miranda. See supra note 21.
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First, and perhaps most important, profound disagreements remain
among the Justices about whether the Miranda rule itself would
survive such an analysis. That is, although several of them might
agree that Miranda warnings do not increase the reliability of
statements, they certainly would not agree about whether
fundamental precepts of due process compel the warnings. That is the
heart of the continuing public policy dispute about Miranda. That is
also precisely why the Miranda majority had to use self-incrimination,
and not due process, as its jumping off place. The seven Justices now
committed, after Dickerson, to continuing the basic rule of Miranda
are unlikely to agree to a re-justification of the rule that emphasizes
its original lack of justification.
On the other hand, the Miranda opponents are just as unlikely
to support such a recasting. Lowering the bar of substantive due
process to encompass the requirement that custodial suspects be
Mirandized would threaten all sorts of activist mischief, 137 a
particularly unappealing prospect to Justices Scalia and Thomas, who
have already expressed profound suspicion about expansive notions of
138
substantive due process.
The members of the Court thus remain locked in an
increasingly bizarre kind of Miranda death grip, whose very originsthe confounding of self-incrimination and due process-assure both its
continuing existence and its feebleness. We can be fairly certain that
three of the current Justices will oppose any future expansions of
Miranda,either directly or by way of shrinking its exceptions. We can
also be fairly certain that three or four others will almost always do
exactly the opposite-oppose any contraction of Miranda, either
directly or by expanding its exceptions. As with many other issues,
what Justices O'Connor and Kennedy decide to do within the limits of

137. For example, all custodial interrogations could be forbidden unless the suspect's lawyer
were present. This is the so-called "strong" or "Miranda-plus"version of Miranda that many
Miranda proponents touted in the early years. Lowering the substantive due process bar in this
fashion could also wreak havoc on the law of search and seizure. For example, one can imagine
the warning idea extended, by way of an invigorated notion of substantive due process, into the
Fourth Amendment, so that all consensual police/citizen encounters must begin with a set of
warnings, such as "We have no probable cause to arrest you, and no reasonable articulable
suspicion to stop you. You are not obligated to talk to us, and are free to go at any time, but if
you decide to leave we may take that into consideration in determining whether we then have a
reasonable articulable suspicion to stop you." We can only shudder to think what such a
Miranda-ization of the Fourth Amendment would do to the law of search and seizure.
138. See supra note 71.
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these extremes will most likely drive the Court's self-incrimination
1 39
law in the next several years.
The Court's recent cases do not give doctrinal purists much
hope. It seems clear that both the Miranda rule and its established
exceptions are here to stay, plus or minus some small adjustments as
outcomes in particular cases get compromised, as in Seibert. Despite
some intriguing suggestions in Justice Kennedy's concurrence in
Seibert that he may be staking out some new territory at the edge of a
narrow bad faith exception-territory that might eventually attract
enough votes for a movement in that direction-Justice O'Connor's
strong dissent makes it clear that such a movement still has a long
way to go.
Nearing its fortieth birthday, Miranda is no longer the
quintessentially vigorous exercise of Warren Court judicial muscle. It
is beginning to show its age, not just in its limited applications, but
also its own sense of purpose. Yet it keeps on, oblivious to the fact
that the same disease that keeps it weak also keeps it alive. We are
most likely in the middle of an important, but very broad, transition in
the theory of self-incrimination. Some day, the Court will probably
reach a consensus about the meaning of the words in the
Self-Incrimination Clause, and that consensus will drive either a
return to original notions of testimonial compulsion (and an overruling
of Miranda) or a complete cutting of the textual bonds (and an
overruling of most or all of Miranda'sexceptions). Until then, we can
expect more false miracle cures and more premature obituaries.

139. Whether two major roadblocks to this movement have been removed with the death
of Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice O'Connor's retirement will depend, of
course, on the Miranda jurisprudence of their successors.

